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NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE
[T]he right to free religious expression embodies a precious
heritage of our history. In a mass society, which presses at every
point toward conformity, the protection of a self-expression, how-
ever unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more
important. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into
the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We
preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect
the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion
1
The term Native American is as broad a designation as the term
European, for it encompasses members of numerous different nations
and tribes. Each tribe has its own traditions, culture, and religion.
This note will not attempt to provide even a general overview of Native
American religious practices but will deal only with those practices
which have come in conflict with state and federal laws in areas not
under the jurisdiction of tribal governments. 2  The central issue will
be the degree of protection which has been afforded these Native
American religious practices under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment.3 The examination will indicate that various state and fed-
1. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 77-78 (1964).
2. In another area the first amendment has been interpreted in a uniform but
surprising manner. Surprisingly, the courts have consistently held that the first amend-
ment does not apply to tribal governments. The Bill of Rights was originally interpreted
as applying only to the federal government and not to the state governments. Barron
v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). Later it was held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment made the restrictions of the first amendment appli-
cable to the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). But because reser-
vations and tribal governments have a unique position within our national structure,
independent of the federal government but also not a state, several decisions have held
that the first amendment is not applicable to them. As one court noted: "No provision
in the Constitution makes the first amendment applicable to Indian nations nor is there
any law of Congress doing so. It follows that neither, under the Constitution or the
laws of Congress, do the Federal courts have jurisdiction of tribal laws or regulations,
even though they may have an impact to some extent on forms of religious worship."
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 135 (10th Cir. 1959).
See also Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Toledo v. Pueblo De Jemez,
119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
3. An important distinction between Native American religious practices and
other religious practices needs to be considered when any comparison is made. In the
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eral courts have been inconsistent in dealing with identical practices.
While some of the variation in results may be attributable to factual
differences in the cases, two determinative factors appear to be (1)
what the court understood to constitute a bona fide religious belief and
(2) the weight which the court attached to the public interest the state
was seeking to protect.
The note will first discuss the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment and the
balancing test which it has developed in applying the clause to specific
factual situations. The discussion will then turn to an examination of
the conflicts which have arisen among state and federal courts in apply-
ing this standard to Native Americans in the areas of peyote, hair
length, and animal protection. The note will conclude that because of
the inconsistencies between the various state and circuit courts, the
United States Supreme Court should clearly articulate the standard to
be applied in cases involving Native American religious practices and
first amendment guarantees.
The Free Exercise Clause
It is well established that the free exercise of religion guaranteed
by the first amendment is not unlimited. While freedom of belief is
absolute, the practice of those beliefs may be regulated. The first case
which considered the free exercise clause and established this distinc-
tion was Reynolds v. United States.4 In Reynolds members of the
Mormon Church, which at that time required polygamy, challenged the
constitutionality of a federal law which prohibited the practice. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute reasoning that while Congress had
been deprived of the power to regulate belief, it still had the power
to forbid religious practices which were subversive of the "good order"
of society. Examining the practice of polygamy, the Court found it to
be destructive of democracy and therefore within the power of Con-
gress to forbid.'
dominant American society a clear distinction is made between a religious practice like
worship and a secular practice like professional sports. In traditional Native American
culture no such distinction exists. Religion permeates every practice of daily life. Cul-
ture defines religion in our contemporary society while religion defines culture in the
traditional Native American society. This basic distinction becomes crucially important
when any particular Native American religious practice is examined by the courts. What
might seem to be of only minimal religious importance to the occidental mind is often
extremely important to the total religious system of a Native American. In fact, the
mere labeling of some practice as cultural and not religious imposes an occidental preju-
dice which seriously affects the outcome of any court's decision. See generally, V. DE-
LORRA, GOD Is RED 247-71 (1973).
4. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
5. Id. at 165-66.
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Recent cases have placed limits on the states' power to regulate
religious practices in the interest of "good order." The Supreme Court
has applied a balancing test in which the interest of the state in regulat-
ing a religious practice is weighed against the practitioner's interest in
the free exercise of his religion. One case which carefully delineates
the balancing test is Sherbert v. Verner.6 In Sherbert a Seventh-Day
Adventist had been denied state unemployment compensation on the
ground that she had refused to accept employment. The appellant
claimed that her religious beliefs precluded her from accepting any
position which required her to work on Saturday (her Sabbath). The
Supreme Court held that the state's denial of unemployment benefits
to the appellant unconstitutionally infringed on the free exercise of her
religion. The Court reasoned that before the state may restrict some
religious practice some compelling state interest must outweigh the in-
dividual's interest in religious freedom. In order fo" the state's interest
to be compelling, the Court stated:
[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would 'suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional
area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation."
7
Rejecting the state's claim that allowing a first amendment exemption
from the requirement that claimants be willing to accept Saturday em-
ployment would lead to the filing of spurious claims, the Supreme Court
stated that the state had the burden of demonstrating "that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing first
amendment rights."'
While Sherbert places the burden of proof on the state to demon-
strate both a compelling state interest in the regulation of a religious prac-
tice and the absence of less restrictive alternatives before a regulation will
withstand a constitutional test, other Supreme Court cases have held
that the individual claiming that a regulation infringes on the free exer-
cise of his religion must establish that his beliefs are held in good faith9
and that the regulated conduct is part of the practice of his religion.10
In United States v. Ballard," the defendants, husband and wife
leaders of the "I Am" movement, were convicted in a federal district
court of mail fraud for soliciting funds through the mails while claiming
that they were communicating with Jesus, had to power to heal incur-
able diseases, and would impart divine messages to the world. The
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7. Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 407.
9. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
10. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
11. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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trial court had carefully instructed the jury that the truth or falsity of
the defendants' beliefs was not to be considered and that the jury was
to confine itself to deciding whether or not the defendants held their
beliefs in good faith. 12 On appeal the defendants objected to this limi-
tation, claiming that they should have had the opportunity to prove the
truth of their teachings. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that restricting the issue to the question of good faith was
error.1 3  The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding
that permissible judicial inquiry is properly limited to a determination
of whether a claimant holds a belief in good faith or is merely using
the religious claim as a shield for his illegal activities. An inquiry into
the theological merits of a claimant's beliefs was held to be foreclosed
by the first amendment. As the Court put it:
[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents' religious
doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. What-
ever this particular indictment might require, the First Amendment
precludes such a course . . . . Heresy trials are foreign to our
Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They
may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.'
4
From Ballard it is clear that an individual claiming that the practice
of his religion is protected by the free exercise clause does not have
to establish that his beliefs are theologically sound but only that he
holds them in good faith.
The free exercise clause guarantees freedom of religion, and
recent decisions by the Supreme Court have indicated that this term
will be strictly construed. Thus, if an objection to a state regulation
is to succeed, the claimant must demonstrate that the regulation inter-
feres with the free exercise of his religion. Nonreligious objections to
state regulations, including those based on ethical and cultural grounds,
are not entitled to first amendment protection.
The issue of what constituted a religious belief entitling the claim-
ants to protection under the free exercise clause was discussed by the
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder.15 In Yoder, members of the
Amish church had been convicted under a state law which required
children to attend school until they were sixteen. The defendants al-
lowed their children to attend public school through the eighth grade
but objected to higher education on the grounds that the values taught
in public schools endangered their children's salvation. The Supreme
Court stated:
12. Part of the court's instruction to the jury was as follows: "The issue is: Did
these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did, they
should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that." Id. at 81.
13. Ballard v. United States, 138 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1943).
14. 322 U.S. at 86 (citations omitted).
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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[Te have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must
be rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what
is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection
may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards
on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important
interests.' 8
However, the Court did not articulate any standard which other courts
could use in deciding whether or not a belief was in fact "religious."
Instead, it confined itself to an analysis of the facts of the case before
it. Noting both the Biblical foundation which the parents claimed for
their belief and the fact that an organized group, with an established
life style, supported the individual claimants, the Court found that the
defendants' objections were based on religious beliefs.17 Concluding
that the impact of the state regulation on the defendants' exercise of
their religion was severe, the Court held that the defendants' interest
in the free exercise of their religion outweighed the state's interest in
the regulation and that therefore the statute, as applied to these defend-
ants, was unconstitutional.18
These cases indicate that the Supreme Court has developed a
four-part test which will be used to determine if a state statute unconsti-
tutionally infringes on the free exercise of an individual's religion. 19
First, it must be established that the religious beliefs are. held in good
faith.20  Second, if the conduct is to be protected it must be part of
the practice of the religion.2' Third, the religious importance of the
conduct must be balanced against any compelling state interest in its
regulation.2  Fourth, for the regulation to be upheld it must be the
least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's compelling inter-
est. 23  Thus, if a statute is determined to infringe upon the free exer-
cise of an individual's religion, the extent of that infringement is
16. Id. at 215-16.
17. Id. at 216-17.
18. Id. at 234.
19. Controversies concerning the free exercise clause actually follow two distinct
patterns. Some cases involve a state regulation which requires some action on the part
of the individual and the individual objects, claiming that his religion requires him to
abstain from such action. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Other cases
involve a state regulation which forbids some action on the individual's part and the
individual objects, claiming that his religion requires that he perform the activity. E.g.,
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). However,
while the patterns in the two types of cases are distinct, the same test is applied in
both.
20. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
21. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
23. Id.
balanced against the weight of the society's interests in enforcing the
regulation. 4
Although this four-part test appears to present a clear standard for
lower courts to follow, one aspect of the test remains unclear. While
the Supreme Court's decision in Yoder emphasizes that only religious
practices are protected under the free exercise clause, neither the
Yoder decision nor any other Supreme Court decision attempts to de-
fine the meaning of the terms "religious" or "religion." The problem
is further complicated by the fact that in Yoder the existence of an
organized group with an historically successful life style was cited by
the Court as supporting the finding that the defendants' assertions were
in fact religious.2" This language can be read as implying a new test:
in order for a practice to be deemed religious, historical and cultural
support for the practice must be established. The remaining ambiguity
regarding the meaning of the terms "religion" and "religious" seriously
weakens the guidance which is furnished to lower courts.
An examination of cases involving claims of violations of religious
freedom affecting Native Americans reveals that the Supreme Court's
standards have not been uniformly interpreted or applied. In order
to facilitate comparison and minimize factual distinctions, the cases will
be discussed in three subject matter groupings: cases involving the use
of peyote and the Native American church, cases concerning regulation
of hair length, and cases involving animal protection regulations.
Peyote
While older cases held that a Native American's use of peyote was
not protected by the first amendment, recent cases in state courts have
held that the use of peyote is protected from state regulation if used
in the exercise of a bona fide religious belief. However, conflict exists
concerning what an individual claiming protection under the free exer-
cise clause must establish in order to be protected. One state has re-
quired that a Native American who uses peyote belong to the Native
American church while another state has refused to grant legal recog-
nition to the church. Finally, one circuit court has held that due
24. While this note is confined to a discussion of the free exercise clause, several
of the cited cases also include discussions of the establishment clause. A different test
is used to determine if there has been an infraction of the establishment clause. In
order for a state regulation to stand when it is challenged as violating the establishment
clause, three criteria must be satisfied. First, the purpose of the statute must be the
regulation of some legitimate secular interest of the state. Second, the effect of the
statute on religion must be neutral, neither advancing nor retarding religion in general.
Third, the statute must not bring about excessive governmental entanglement with re-
ligion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
25. 406 U.S. at 216-18.
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process does not require a prearrest determination that a defendant
possessing peyote was not acting in the exercise of a bona fide religious
belief.
History of Peyote Usage
The history of Native American use of peyote, Lophophora
williamsii, is obscure to the dominant society, but anthropologists agree
that it was used by several Mexican tribes before the coming of Colum-
bus.2" The first written record of usage by Native Americans within
the United States was in 1716.27 While the experts do not agree on
the course of the spread of the religious use of peyote among American
tribes, some have argued that its spread was accelerated by the inter-
tribal contacts established when members of different tribes served in
the United States armed forces in World War J.28 In any event, by
1940 the religious use of peyote was established in at least fifty differ-
ent tribes within the United States.
20
A typical peyote meeting includes prayer, song, and the ingestion
of peyote in sufficient amounts to induce visions.
At an early but fixed stage in the ritual the members pass
around a ceremonial bag of peyote buttons. Each adult may take
four, the customary number, or take none. The participants chew
the buttons, usually with some difficulty because of extreme bitter-
ness .... 30
The meeting usually lasts from sunset to sunrise. By sunrise the effects
of the peyote have worn off and the participants depart.
Conflict Among The State Courts
One of the earliest cases to challenge a state regulation on the
grounds that it violated the free exercise clause was State v. Big
Sheep.3 In Big Sheep the defendant was a member of the Crow tribe
who was arrested within the reservation for possessing peyote in viola-
tion of a state statute. Appealing his conviction for unlawful posses-
sion of peyote to the Supreme Court of Montana, the defendant claimed
that the lower court erred in not allowing him to prove that he was a
member of the Native American church and that the church's "sacramen-
tal" use of peyote was protected under the first amendment. Because
the court remanded the case for a new trial to determine certain juris-
26. W. LABARRE, THE PEYOTE CULT 109 (1970).
27. Id. at 110.
28. See generally Note, Peyote and The Native American Church, 2 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 71 (1974).
29. W. LABARRE, THE PEYOTE CULT 122 (1970).
30. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 721, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1964).
31. 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926).
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dictional questions involving the reservation, it did not directly rule on
the merits of the defendant's first amendment claims. Dicta in the de-
cision, however, emphasized that while the lower court should deter-
mine if the defendant had the peyote in his possession in accord with
a bona fide religious belief, that in itself would not constitute a defense.
Reviewing the precedents in the United States Supreme Court, the
Montana court stated:
[I]t was never intended or supposed that the first amendment
to the Constitution . . . should be invoked as a protection against
legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good
order, and morals of society.32
One of the factors which caused the court to attach little weight to the
defendant's first amendment claims appears to stem from the court's
theological differences with the defendant.3a The court characterized
the defendant's beliefs as the product of an erroneous interpretation
of certain Biblical passages. Since the decision in Big Sheep, the
Supreme Court has held that judicial inquiry into the theological merits
of an individual's religious beliefs is foreclosed by the first amend-
ment. 4 Therefore, the Montana court might not adopt the same ap-
proach in a similar case today, but Big Sheep has yet to be overruled.
Two recent cases, using a balancing test, have given protection to
the Native Americans' use of peyote under the free exercise clause.
The first reported case so holding was People v. Woody. 5 The de-
fendants in Woody were Navajos who were arrested while engaging in
a peyote ritual in a hogan made of railroad ties. Police officers ob-
served the defendants through cracks between the railroad ties and
charged them with violating a state regulation prohibiting possession of
peyote. Although the district attorney stipulated that at the time of
the arrest the defendants were using peyote in a religious ceremony,
the trial court, without a jury, rejected the defendants' first amendment
claims. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In
reaching its result, the court relied heavily on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner which held that for a
32. Id. at 239, 243 P. at 1073, citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
33. In fact, the court engaged in an argument over the defendant's interpretation
of scripture: "We do not find peyote or any like herb mentioned by Isaiah, or by
Saint Paul . . . nor does it seem from the language employed that Saint John the Divine
had any such in mind." Id.
34. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See text accompanying notes
11-14 supra.
35. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). While Woody is
the first reported decision so holding, the California Supreme Court noted that an unre-
ported Arizona case reached the same result. 61 Cal. 2d at 724, 394 P.2d at 819,
40 Cal. Rptr. at 75, citing Arizona v. Attakai, No. 4098 (Coconino County, Ariz.,
July 26, 1960).
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challenged regulation to stand, the state must demonstrate both a com-
pelling state interest in the regulation of the religious practice and the
absence of less restrictive alternatives.36 The California Supreme Court
interpreted Sherbert to hold that while the state may abridge religious
practices, it may do so only "upon a demonstration that some com-
pelling state interest outweighs the defendants' interests in religious
freedom. '3 7 Furthermore, in applying this balancing test the state's in-
terest must be substantial if it is to prevail."' Examining the facts in
the case, the court concluded that the use of peyote was absolutely cen-
tral to the nature of the Native American church and that to proscribe
its use was tantamount to prohibiting the religion itself.39 Against this
the court weighed the gravity of the state's interest in prohibiting the
use of peyote and rejected as unfounded the state's arguments that
peyote was deleterious to the Native American community and that the
sanctioned use of peyote for religious purposes would place an intoler-
able strain on the state's enforcement of its drug laws.4 0  Finally, in
response to the attorney general's contention that a case-by-case inquiry
into the bona fides of every defendants' religious beliefs was both un-
duly burdensome and contrary to the spirit of the law, the court replied
that while the first amendment barred judicial inquiry into the truth or
falsity of the theological tenets of any religion, an examination of the
sincerity of the defendant is an accepted part of our judicial heritage.
41
Since the state had stipulated that the defendants' religious claim was
bona fide, the court concluded that the free exercise clause protected
the defendants' religious use of peyote from state regulation. The
court stated:
We have weighed the competing values represented in this case on
the symbolic scale of constitutionality. On the one side we have
placed the weight of freedom of religion as protected by the First
Amendment; on the other, the weight of the state's "compelling in-
terest." . The scale tips in favor of the constitutional protec-
tion. 4
2
Following its decision in Woody, the California Supreme Court
36. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See notes 6-8 & accompanying text supra.
37. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 718, 394 P.2d 813, 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (1964).
38. Id. at 719, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
39. The court stated: "Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar
to bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament. Peyote
constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are directed to it much as prayers
are devoted to the Holy Ghost." Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
40. Id. at 722-23, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
41. The court concluded: "Thus the court makes a factual examination of the
bona fides of the belief and does not intrude into the religious issue at all; it does
not determine the nature of the belief but the nature of defendants' adherence to it."
id. at 726, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
42. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
extended the protection of the first amendment to those who used
peyote in accordance with a bona fide religious belief but who were
not members of any formal religious body. The petitioner in In Re
Grady was the self-ordained leader and teacher of a group of defend-
ants convicted of illegal possession of peyote.43 Granting a writ of
habeas corpus, the court remanded the case for a determination of the
factual question whether or not the defendant was "actually engaged
in good faith in the practice of a religion." 4  The court stated that its
holding in Woody was "that the state may not prohibit the use of peyote
in connection with bona fide practice of a religious belief."45
The second state to conclude that the religious use of peyote
should be protected was Arizona in State v. Whittingham.4 6 The de-
fendants were a husband and wife who were arrested for using peyote
during their marriage ceremony conducted by the Native American
church. State undercover agents were present in the hogan and ar-
rested the defendants and others present during the blessing of the
marriage. The lower court found that the defendants were sincere in
their beliefs and that according to their beliefs a bona fide ceremony
could not take place without the use of peyote. The court noted:
The peyote is, in fact, central and primary to the ceremony. It
is considered to be a sacred symbol, or divine plant around which
the entire service is organized. The congregation prays to and
through the peyote, which is ingested by the members of the con-
gregation. . . . A bona fide ceremony cannot take place without
the presence of peyote.
47
However, the lower court rejected the defendants' claim that such an
activity is protected under the first amendment. Accepting the lower
court's determination of the facts, including the bona fide nature of the
defendants' beliefs, the Arizona Court of Appeals confined its decision
to the issue of whether such a practice was protected by the first amend-
ment. Citing Sherbert,48 the court reasoned that an individual has a
right to the free exercise of his religion without governmental interfer-
ence unless the state is able to prove that a competing state interest
is strong enough to require its regulation. Furthermore, the court
stated that before the issue of a competing state interest is reached,
it must be established that the state regulation precludes or prohibits
the free exercise of religion. Concluding that the defendants had estab-
lished that the exercise of their religion had been effectively prohibited,
the court noted:
43. 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
44. Id. at 888, 394 P.2d 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 913.
45. Id.
46. 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
47. Id. at 28, 504 P.2d 951.
48. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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[T]he trial court's findings made several determinations in which
Peyotism was found to be an established religion of many centuries'
history. Suffice it to say, therefore, that Peyotism is not a twen-
tieth century cult nor a fad subject to extinction at a whim ...
The religion is established with a following of several hundred
thousand believers. 9
Since the lower court had already determined that the free exer-
cise of religion was seriously curtailed by the prohibition against the
use of peyote, the crucial question before the court was whether the
state had demonstrated a compelling reason to sustain the regulation.
The court of appeals concluded that the state had "failed to sustain its
burden of proof upon this issue."50  In support of its conclusion the
court pointed to the fact that expert testimony had declared peyote to
be non-habit-forming and that other states had passed statutes per-
mitting the religious use of peyote. Finally, the court stated that it had
been "guided" by the California Supreme Court's decisions in Woody
and Grady and quoted at length from those decisions with approval. 5 '
Its evident from these cases that the religious use of peyote is
protected under the first amendment as interpreted by the courts of
Arizona and California. In both of these states, a Native American
(and non-Native American) is able to raise a religious defense to at-
tempted prosecution under the state's regulation of peyote whether or
not he is a member of an organized or recognized religious group.
However, there are some limitations on the protections given to the re-
ligious use of peyote which continue to exert a "chilling effect" on this
Native American religious practice. Furthermore, it is not clear that
other states will provide the basic protection guaranteed under the first
amendment by the California and Arizona courts.
Limitations of the Protection of Peyote: Formal Membership
One state has held that the protection given the religious use and
possession of peyote applies only if the defendant is able to supply con-
crete proof of his membership in the Native American church. In
Whitehorn v. State, 2 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals re-
viewed a defendant's conviction for illegal possession of peyote. The
defendant had appealed, claiming that he was a member of the Native
American church and that the religious use of peyote by members of
the church was protected by the first amendment. The court cited
49. 19 Ariz. App. at 29, 504 P.2d at 952. Interestingly, this part of the court's
analysis is strikingly similar to the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Yoder case, yet
Yoder is not cited in the opinion. See notes 15-18 & accompanying text supra.
50. 19 Ariz. App. at 29, 504 P.2d at 952.
51. Id. at 31-32, 504 P.2d at 954-55.
52. Whitehorn v. State, No. F-75-476 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App., June 23, 1976).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Sherber5 ' as establishing that an individual has the right to the free
exercise of his religious beliefs without governmental "interference un-
less a contravening compelling state interest in regulation is shown."54
Citing both Woody and Whittingham,55 the court found that the state
had failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest in unlimited regu-
lation. However, the court confined its holding that the religious use
of peyote was protected by the first amendment to "the established
Native American church and its members."56  The court then reasoned
that since it was the duty of the state to enforce its drug possession laws,
it was not unreasonable to require that individuals asserting a first
amendment defense be required to prove that at the time of the offense
they were enrolled members of the Native American church." The
defendant in Whitehorn had been able to call two members of the
Native American church to testify on his behalf. Both stated that they
knew the defendant to be a member of the church. The president of
the Native American church in Oklahoma also testified and stated that
the church had no membership rolls.5 8 Emphasizing the state's interest
in effective drug enforcement, the court stated:
To require the Native American Church to keep a formal roll of
its active members is not an unwarranted or unreasonable burden
nor does it infringe upon the First Amendment rights of freedom
of religion. 59
The court concluded that since the defendant had been unable to "show
that he was an active member of the Native American church as
formally reflected by its membership rolls," the lower court had not
erred in refusing to recognize that his use of peyote was protected by
the first amendment. °
The decision in Whitehorn is unique in that the court did not
follow the usual four-part test to determine if the state regulation im-
permissibly infringed on the free exercise of the defendant's religion.
Instead, the court asserted a new regulation-the requirement of mem-
bership in the Native American church-and then proceeded to
53. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54. No. F-75-476 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App., June 23, 1976).
55. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964);
People v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
946 (1974).
56. No. F-75-476 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App., June 23, 1976).
57. Id. In making this requirement the court nowhere discusses the issue of
whether this violates the establishment clause. See note 24 supra.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The court's ruling in effect limited the availability of this defense to Native
Americans since the testimony indicated that an individual had to be a Native Ameri-
can to belong to the church. Id.
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analyze the legitimate state purpose underlying this new regulation.61
Because the Native American church is a syncretistic religion, incor-
porating many elements of Christian theology and worship,62 many tra-
ditional Native American peyotists will have nothing to do with the
church. Thus the court's requirement of membership in the Native
American church before the religious use of peyote will be constitution-
ally protected in effect denies protection to Peyotists who follow more
traditional Native American religious beliefs.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that the free
exercise clause protects only those users of peyote who are formally
enrolled in the Native American church clearly conflicts with the Cali-
fornia and Arizona decisions holding that the bona fide religious use
of peyote is protected by the first amendment whether or not an indi-
vidual belongs to any formal religious body. While Whitehorn contains
no reference to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Yoder,
63
the Oklahoma court may have been influenced by the reasoning in that
decision. In Yoder, the Supreme Court stated that the first amend-
ment protects only religious practices and does not permit "every per-
son to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society
as a whole has important interests."64 While not defining the meaning
of the word "religious," the Yoder decision reasons that the beliefs in-
volved in that case are religious because, among other things, they are
shared by an organized religious group.65 Whether or not the Okla-
homa court relied on the reasoning in Yoder, Whitehorn indicates that
the constitutional protection afforded the religious use of peyote is in-
terpreted differently by the courts of different states.
Due Process Rights
The protection given Native Americans under the free exercise
clause has been rendered partially meaningless by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Golden Eagle v. Johnson,0
the Ninth Circuit ruled that a Native American in possession of peyote
may still be subject to temporary incarceration even if the law specifi-
cally recognizes the right to use peyote in the practice of a religion. The
defendant in Golden Eagle was arrested after the police had stopped
his car because it lacked a license plate light. After observing "furtive
movements" in the vehicle and determining that the car was not
61. The court's analysis here more closely resembles the traditional establishment
clause test than the free exercise clause test. See note 24 supra.
62. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
63. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
64. Id. at 215-16.
65. Id. at 216-17.
66. 493 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
registered to either the driver or the passenger, the officers searched
the car preliminary to taking it into custody. Golden Eagle, the
passenger, informed the officers that a wooden box in the car contained
religious paraphernalia, that he was a member of the Native American
church, and that he had a constitutional right to use peyote.1 7 Golden
Eagle was nonetheless arrested and jailed for thirty-one days. During
that time he continued to assert his membership in the Native Ameri-
can church and suggested ways in which that membership could be
verified. During the same period his landlady called the authorities
and made suggestions as to how both Golden Eagle's right to use peyote
and his membership in the Native American church could be proved.18
All criminal charges against the defendant were dropped before the
trial. Golden Eagle then instituted proceedings to declare such arrests
unconstitutional, enjoin like future arrests, destroy certain records, and
recover damages from the authorities responsible for his arrest and im-
prisonment. When the United States District Court dismissed six of
the plaintiff's seven causes of action, he appealed. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision. It rejected the plaintiff's argument
that, because the religious use of peyote was protected under the first
amendment, any arrest required either a warrant based upon an ex
parte showing that probable cause exists to believe that the possession
and use of peyote is not for bona fide religious purposes or, alterna-
tively, that the arresting officer be required to make a good faith effort
to verify the sincerity of the religious claims of one found in the posses-
sion of peyote prior to placing him under arrest. 9 In asserting these
procedural rights, the plaintiff relied on similar restrictions imposed by
the United States Supreme Court for the seizure of allegedly obscene
material. 70 Rejecting Golden Eagle's arguments, the court reasoned
that these special procedures developed by the Supreme Court concern-
ing obscene material were designed not to protect the individual from
whom the seizure was made but to protect the public's right to an un-
obstructed circulation of books. 71 The court also declined to rule on
whether the first amendment protected the religious use of peyote by
assuming, "without deciding, that the interpretation of the First Amend-
ment appearing in People v. Woody . . . is proper. ' 72 The court also
noted that nowhere in Woody did the California Supreme Court indi-
67. 493 F.2d at 1181.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1182.
70. Id. Golden Eagle relied upon a Supreme Court decision which held that be-
fore allegedly obscene material could be seized, due process required an adversary hear-
ing preceding seizure to show that reasonable grounds existed to believe that the mate-
rial was in fact obscene. See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
71. 493 F.2d at 1184.
72. Id. at 1183.
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cate that any special criminal procedures were to be adopted to reduce
the "chilling effect" of the California laws relating to the possession of
peyote. The court of appeals reasoned:
Certainly a belief on the part of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia that its decision would require the special procedures urged
on us by the plaintiff should have been revealed, or at least
intimated.7 3
The court concluded that since Woody did not hold that regulation of
peyote was unconstitutional per se, "[ain equivalent result should not
be reached indirectly by the adoption of superfluous or unworkable
procedures preceding arrest and seizure."
74
As a result of the Golden Eagle decision, the Native American
who uses peyote in the exercise of his religion in California faces the
uncertainty created by rulings of the highest state court which recog-
nize his constitutional right to do so and an equally authoritative federal
ruling that he is still subject to arrest and detention until his good faith
in using peyote is established. Although the Ninth Circuit rejected
Golden Eagle's argument that this creates a "chilling effect" on the free
exercise of religion, in California the peyotist who practices his beliefs
in good faith continues to do so at his peril.
The circuit court of appeals was undoubtedly correct in saying that
Woody does not hold that the regulation of peyote is unconstitutional
per se. However, Woody and Grady do hold that the bona fide religi-
ous use of peyote is constitutionally protected. Some procedural safe-
guard does seem to be required to protect those who use peyote in the
exercise of their religion. One possible alternative would be to require
that any individual who is arrested for possession of peyote, and who
claims that he uses peyote in the exercise of his religion, be granted
an immediate judicial hearing to determine the sole issue of whether
such beliefs are held in good faith. Should the hearing result in a de-
termination of good faith, the suspect would be released and all charges
dropped. A determination that the beliefs were not held in good faith
would be reasonable grounds to detain him for trial.
Legal Recognition of the Native American Church
In addition to the uncertainties which surround the individual
Native American who uses peyote in the exercises of his religion in
California and Oklahoma, the rights of Native Americans to organize
into a formal church have also been subject to limitation in Arizona.
Native American Church of Navajoland, Inc. v. Corporation Commis-
73. Id. at 1185.
74. Id. at 1186.
sion 7 5 recognized Arizona's power to refuse to allow the Native Ameri-
can church to become incorporated within the state.
When the Native American church sought a certificate of incor-
poration from the Arizona Corporation Commission, the church listed
as one of the purposes of the proposed corporation the use of peyote
within its worship. Since the use of peyote was a misdemeanor in
Arizona and since the Arizona corporation law limited corporations to
those which pursued a "lawful" purpose, the commission denied the
certificate. 7  The members of the church then instituted a class action
suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, asking that the Arizona laws
regulating the use of peyote be declared unconstitutional under the first
amendment and asking that the Corporation Commission be compelled
to issue the church a certificate of incorporation. The United States
District Court held that the denial of the certificate of incorporation did
not infringe on the plaintiffs' free exercise of their religion. The court
noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the corporate form of or-
granization was essential to their religious practices or that they sought
any of the traditional benefits of incorporation such as favorable tax
treatment and limited financial liability. Since the plaintiffs had al-
leged no specific injury, the court reasoned that the denial of the cer-
tificate of incorporation did not constitute an actual controversy. Simi-
larly, the plaintiffs had not alleged that there had been any past prose-
cutions or threat of future prosecutions under the state's drug laws
because of the plaintiffs' use of peyote in their religious practices.
Consequently, it was not necessary for the court to determine if the stat-
utes regulating the use and possession of peyote were unconstitutional
since this claim also failed to present an actual controversy. Character-
izing the plaintiffs' suit as a "naked challenge to Arizona's drug laws,"
the court dismissed the suit for failing to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.77
This case indicates that the judicial recognition of the Native
American church varies from state to state. The federal court in Ari-
zona upheld the state authorities' denial of official recognition to the
church while the Oklahoma court required an officially recognized body
before first amendment protections would apply to its individual
members. 8
75. 329 F. Supp. 907 (D. Ariz. 1971).
76. Id. at 909.
77. Id. at 910.
78. After the decision in Native American Church of Navajoland, Inc. v. Corpora-
tion Commission, 329 F. Supp. 907 (D. Ariz. 1971), which upheld the denial of a
certificate of incorporation to the Native American church because the church advocated
an illegal activity (the religious use of peyote), the Arizona Court of Appeals, in State
v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1946
(1974), held that the bona fide religious use of peyote is protected by the free exercise
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Summary
Among the jurisdictions which have decided the issue, there is no
concensus regarding the degree of protection afforded the religious use
of peyote by Native Americans. Although some state courts have held
that the bona fide religious use of peyote is protected by the first
amendment, other courts have imposed limitations on the extent of this
protection. The lack of due process requirements and the varying
status of the Native American church cannot help but create uncertainty
in the mind of the individual practitioner of peyotism and hence have
a chilling effect on the exercise of the religion.
Hair Length
History
In the late nineteenth century the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
created a system of boarding schools for Native Americans.
[T]he express policy [of the schools was] stripping the Indian
child of his cultural heritage and identity: "Such schools were run
in a rigid military fashion, with heavy emphasis on rustic vocational
education. They were designed to separate a child from his reser-
vation and family, strip him of his tribal lore and mores, force the
complete abandonment of his native language, and prepare him for
never again returning to his people."79
As a party of the process of acculturation, Native American students
were forced to cut their hair and adopt a European hair style.80 The
federal policy of destroying traditional tribal life styles received express
congressional approval as late as 1944.1l
Conflict
In several recent cases Native Americans have challenged state
and federal regulations of hair length as unconstitutionally prohibitive
of the free exercise of their religion. The courts have disagreed as
to the extent of the protection accorded by the first amendment to such
practices. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has ruled that
the first amendment prohibits such regulations from being applied to
Native Americans whose religious beliefs require them to wear long
clause. See note 46 supra. However, the Whittingham decision makes no requirement
that to be protected the user must be a member of the Native American church. The
effect of the Whittingham decision on the holding in Native American Church of Nava-
joland remains unclear.
79. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1097, 1101 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. 480 F.2d at 696.
81. See id.
hair,82 while the Tenth Circuit and one state court have held that any
infringement on first amendment rights is insubstantial.8 3
In New Rider v. Board of Education, three Pawnee students
claimed that their civil rights had been violated by a junior high school
regulation which prohibited hair lengths which touched the collar or
was worn in odd styles.8 4 The students offered expert testimony in the
trial court that long hair has a religious significance to the Pawnee and
that certain traditional dances require the wearing of long braided
hair. 5 The students themselves were members of a Native American
dancing troupe. The leader of the student dance troupe, an old man
who once traveled with Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, had himself
been the victim of a BIA boarding school in which he had been forced
to cut his hair.88  Though this case arose after the United States
Supreme Court had held that judicial determinations should be limited
to the sincerity of an individual's belief and is precluded by the first
amendment from inquiring into the theological validity of those be-
liefs,87 the court allowed defendants to introduce their own expert who
testified that the wearing of long hair was not a part of Pawnee tradition
or culture.88 The superintendent of schools also testified that it would
be impossible to maintain an ordered atmosphere in the public schools
if the hair length regulations were required to allow for ethnic differ-
ences.89  The lower court initially issued a permanent injunction and
then reversed itself, holding that the regulation did not violate "any of
the plaintiffs' rights regarding any religious creed or belief . . . ."'0 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding. The court
reasoned that since the freedom of religious practice was not absolute,
the balancing test need not be applied until some regulation impinged
upon an individual's fundamental liberties. In the court's view, hair
82. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aII'd sub norn. Tete-
rud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
83. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Pokrywka v. Weld County School Dist.,
No. 24786 (Weld County, Colo. Dist. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974).
84. 480 F.2d at 695.
85. Id. at 696. See also G. WELTFISH, THE LOST UNIVERSE 492-93 (197 1).
86. For an example of the way in which radically different weight is attached
to the same freedom, see Douglas's dissent to the denial of certiorari in New Rider.
414 U.S. 1097. Justice Douglas felt that because of the past history of Native Ameri-
cans being forced to abandon their traditional practices in government schools, including
being forced to cut their hair, great weight should have been given to the students'
interest in the free exercise of this practice.
87. U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1943). See notes 11-14 & accompanying
text supra.
88. 480 F.2d at 697.
89. Id. at 697-98.
90. Id. at 696.
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length was not a fundamental liberty.91 The court also expressed its
fear that since the United States Supreme Court had recently held that
one could be a conscientious objector to military service without sub-
scribing to a traditional religion or creed, 92 to allow an exception to the
regulation on religious grounds in this case would open the door to
myriad individual objections and create a "quagmire" for local school
boards.93
The court in New Rider apparently believed that the school
board's interest in uniform student discipline was more compelling than
the individual student's interest in the exercise of his religious beliefs.
It also reasoned that to require the school authorities to recognize these
Native Americans' religious objections to the regulation would put an
intolerable strain on its enforcement. Yet other courts have held that
similar regulations are not so brittle and are capable of withstanding
the pressure of exemptions based on religious objections.9"
Teterud v. Burnes95 was an appeal by the warden of an Iowa state
penitentiary from a lower court decision which had held that the
prison's prohibition against long hair violated the first amendment rights
of a Native American inmate. The appellee had initiated the litigation
by seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the prison regulation,
claiming that the regulation infringed on the free exercise of his re-
ligion which required him to wear his hair long and braided. The
United States District Court granted the injunction, holding that
Teterud sincerely held the belief that Native American religion re-
quired him to wear his hair in braids and that there were less restric-
tive means which could serve the interests of the penitentiary's adminis-
tration.9 In his appeal, the warden challenged both the lower court's
application of the first amendment and its findings of fact regarding the
sincerity of Teterud's religious beliefs and the availability of less restric-
tive alternatives. The appellants argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Yoder17 mandated a finding that hair style is a secular belief
based on the secular considerations of racial pride and personal prefer--
ence and therefore not protected by the free exercise clause. They
further argued that before the free exercise clause would apply,
Teterud would have to prove that the wearing of long hair is an absolute
91. Id. at 698.
92. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1963).
93. 480 F.2d at 700.
94. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), affd sub nom. Tete-
rud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); Pokrywka v. Weld County School Dist.,
No. 24786 (Weld County, Colo. Dist. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974).
95. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
96. 385 F. Supp. at 160.
97. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See notes 15-18 & accompanying text supra.
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tenet of Native American religion and is practiced by all believersY8
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected these arguments
and cited Yoder as supporting their holding that "[w]hile also a
matter of tradition, the wearing of long hair for religious reasons is a
practice protected from government regulation by the Free Exercise
Clause." 9 The court emphasized that the orthodoxy of an individual's
religious belief is not for the court to determine. The court also re-
jected for lack of proof the prison administration's argument that the
health and safety interests of the prison necessitated any infringement
which might exist to the appellee's first amendment rights.1"0 Thus,
the court concluded, the lower court was correct in its determination
that the regulation impermissibly infringed on the appellee's rights
under the free exercise clause.
New Rider and Teterud indicate that there is a division among
the circuits regarding both the extent of the protection afforded by the
first amendment to Native Americans who wear long hair in the exer-
cise of their religious beliefs and the process which the courts should
use to determine if a Native American's religious claims are bona fide.""
In New Rider the court engaged in inquiry to determine if the beliefs
were generally recognized, while the court in Teterud held that the
othodoxy of the individual's belief was not open to judicial examination.
While it is unclear what treatment a Native American pressing
similar claims in a state court can expect, at least one state court has
held that under New Rider the federal Constitution does not protect
a Native American who challenges school hair length regulations as vio-
lative of his first amendment rights. Pokrywka v. Weld County School
District'1 2 involved two Sioux brothers who were expelled from school
for violating a hair length regulation. The students then sued to chal-
lenge the regulation alleging, among other things, that it violated their
rights under the free exercise clause. A Colorado trial court found that
there was ample evidence to prove that the plaintiff's insistence on long
98. 522 F.2d at 359-60.
99. Id. at 360.
100. Id. at 361-62.
101. The two cases can be distinguished on the facts since one deals with public
school students and the other deals with a penitentiary inmate. But the court in New
Rider upheld the hair length regulation reasoning that the school board's interest in
maintaining uniform student discipline outweighed the individual students' interest in
the free exercise of their religious beliefs. 480 F.2d at 700. The court in Teterud,
on the other hand, rejected the prison warden's assertion that uniform hair length regu-
lation was necessary to maintain both discipline and other health and safety interests
in the prison. 522 F.2d at 361-62. This clearly illustrates the conflict among the cir-
cuits for, if anything, the interest of the prison authorities in maintaining uniform disci-
pline should be nore compelling than the corresponding interest of the school board.
102. No. 24786, at 5 (Weld County, Colo. Dist. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974).
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hair was based upon religious beliefs but was not a basic tenet of an
organized religion. Citing both Yoder and New Rider, the court
reasoned that the Constitution protects only those individuals whose be-
liefs are shared by an organized religious group. 10 3 The court con-
cluded that the federal precedents required a finding that the plaintiffs
were not protected by the free exercise clause. However, the court
found that the clause in the Colorado state constitution which guaran-
tees freedom of religion had been interpreted more broadly and, conse-
quently, held that the plaintiffs' religious freedom had been improperly
abridged by the regulation. 04
Summary
These cases indicate that there is a clear conflict among the courts
as to the extent of the protection afforded by the free exercise clause
to Native Americans who assert that uncontrolled hair length is a neces-
sary part of their religious practice. At the center of the conflict is a
disagreement over what constitutes a "religious" practice. While the
Supreme Court's decision in Yoder emphasizes that the free exercise
clause protects only religious practices, the Court has not established
any guidelines which lower courts can use to determine whether or not
a particular belief is "religious."'1 5 The issue seems likely to remain
confused until such guidelines are established.'0 6
Protected Species
A central idea underlying much of Native American religion is the
unity of man with nature and the concomitant idea that man and other
animals are brothers.
We did not think of the great open plains, the beautiful rolling hills,
and winding streams with tangled growth as 'wild.' Only to the
white men was nature a 'wilderness' and only to him was the land
'infested' with 'wild' animals .. . To us it was tame. Earth was
bountiful and we were surrounded with the blessings of the Great
Mystery.'
07
Often the sacred stories of Native Americans depict animals as messen-
gers bearing communications from the Great Spirit. 08 Not surprisingly
103. Id.
104. Id. at 6-8.
105. See notes 15-18 & accompanying text supra.
106. The ambiguity surrounding the constitutionality of hair length regulations is
not unique to Native Americans. Douglas, dissenting to the denial of certiorari in New
Rider, noted that the Supreme Court has refused to review the constitutionality of hair
length cases "regardless of the grounds on which the lower courts have reached their
conclusions." 414 U.S. at 1098.
107. Chief Luther Standing Bear, quoted in V. DELORIA, GOD IS RED 105 (1973).
108. See generally G. WELTFISH, THE LOST UNIVERSE 159, 183-84, 316-17, 329-
30, 366-67, 403-06 (1971).
then, the use of animals and animal parts is an essential part of many
Native American religious ceremonies.10  In several recent cases in-
volving protected species, Native Americans have attempted to raise
the free exercise clause as a defense to prosecutions for illegal taking,
possession, and sale of certain animal parts. In cases involving animals
which are an endangered species, there is general agreement that there
is no valid first amendment defense to prosecutions for sales of pro-
tected animal parts. What remains unanswered is whether the mere
taking or possession of endangered species which are necessary to the
practice of Native American religion may be regulated or whether the
free exercise clause prohibits Native Americans from being prosecuted
for violating such regulations."' In a case involving a state regulation
concerning the taking and possession of a nonendangered species, one
state court has held that such a statute impermissibly infringes on the
free exercise of the religion of Native Americans who require the
animal in the practice of their religion."'
Eagle Feather Cases
In United States v. Bushyhead,"12 the defendants were charged
with selling eagle parts in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
The defendants were arrested when they sold eagle feathers to white
undercover agents of the Department of Interior. The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the statute was over-
broad and could not constitutionally be applied to them because it in-
fringed on the free exercise of their religion.1" The court rejected
the claim that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the free exer-
cise of their religion by pointing out that the defendants were not
charged with possession or even sales to fellow Native Americans but
sales for profit to white undercover agents. Observing that the defend-
ants were "not so bold as to suggest that the sales were required reli-
109. Id. See also V. DELORIA, GOD Is RED 102-04 (1973).
110. See Note, Native American Culture: The Use of Feathers As a Protected
Right, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105, n.2 (1974). The author of the note argues that
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 704 (1970), which prohibits the
possession or sale of eagles or their feathers except under such regulations as the Secre-
tary of Interior might make, unconstitutionally infringes on the free exercise of Native
American religion.
111. Order Reversing Decision, Wisconsin v. Funmaker, No. 003042 (Juneau
County, Wis. Cir. Ct., July 23, 1976).
112. United States v. Bushyhead, Magistrate's No. 74-117M (W.D. Okla., June 18,
1974).
113. With respect to the defendants' contention that the statute was overbroad and
abridged free speech, the federal district court held that the statute regulated conduct,
not speech, and that it was not so vague that it might be susceptible of application
to the defendants' expression of their religious beliefs. Consequently the court held
that the overbreadth doctrine did not apply. Id. at 6.
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gious practice,"114 the court concluded that the defendants had not pre-
sented a bona fide religious claim for exemption from prosecution.
The court noted:
While too many Americans of all races, perhaps, worship the
dollar and the pursuit of profit has for them become a way of life,
we do not believe that First Amendment Rights are thereby impli-
cated. The First Amendment protects religious beliefs and opin-
ions but it is not a license to commit criminal acts.115
The court carefully limited its holding concerning the free exercise
clause to the particular offense charged and noted that it had not been
required to decide if the statute could constitutionally be applied to
Native Americans charged with mere taking or possession.' 6
A similar result was reached in United States v. Top Sky. 1 7 The
defendants, charged with the sale of eagle parts, filed a motion to dis-
miss the complaint alleging that the statute violated the free exercise
clause." 8 They argued that requiring them to get a permit before they
could take or possess eagle parts was an unconstitutional prior restraint
on the exercise of their first amendment rights. The court rejected this
argument, noting that any burden imposed on the free exercise of the
defendants' religion was minimal when weighed against the state inter-
est in curtailing widespread dissemination of eagle parts. Observing
that the defendants were not charged with taking or possession but with
sales, the court stated that "the act of selling is deplored by the Indian
religion" 1 9 and dismissed the petition for failing to present a bona fide
religious issue.
Since the decisions in both Bushyhead and Top Sky were issued
in cases in which the defendants were charged with sales, it is not clear
whether a similar result would be reached if a Native American were
charged with taking or possession of eagle feathers in the exercise of
his religion without first obtaining the required permits. While the
Top Sky decision did comment that the burden imposed by the required
permits was outweighed by the government's interest in preventing the
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 7-8.
116. Id. at 8.
117. United States v. Top Sky, No. 4-75-4 (D.C. Idaho, July 17, 1975).
118. The defendants also alleged that the statute violated the establishment clause.
Citing the tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court
held that since the defendants were charged with sales and not mere possession, and
since the statute specifically permits Native Americans to apply for permits to take
and possess eagle parts, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1971), the statute had the requisite neutral
effect on religion. The court also dismissed for want of actual controversy the defend-
ants' contention that the third part of the Lemon test had been violated, holding that
the case did not demonstrate excessive governmental entanglement with religion. United
States v. Bushyhead, No. 4-75-4, at 2-3 (D.C. Idaho, July 17, 1975).
119. United States v. Bushyhead, No. 4-75-4, at 3 (D.C. Idaho, July 17, 1975).
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widespread dissemination of eagle parts, that statement was not neces-
sary to its holding since the defendants were charged only with sales.
And the court in Bushyhead carefully refrained from deciding whether
the free exercise clause could be raised as a valid defense in a prosecution
for mere taking or possession. The two cases clearly state that the free
exercise clause does not protect those charged with sales of controlled
animal parts, but they provide no authoritative holding on whether or
not the religious use of protected animal parts may be validly regulated.
One state court has held that a state fish and game regulation
which required similar permits for the taking of deer unconstitutionally
infringed upon the free exercise of the religious beliefs of Native
Americans who required deer parts for the performance of their religi-
ous rituals. The War Bundle Feast is one of the principal celebrations
of the Winnebago tribe. In connection with the feast, deer are hunted.
Both the ritual of the hunt and the preparation and use of the deer
parts are minutely prescribed by Winnebago religious beliefs. r 0  In
Wisconsin v. Funmaker,121 the defendant, a Winnebago, was charged
with possession of a deer carcass in violation of a state regulation which
required hunting permits and the tagging of all deer killed. He
pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the statute infringed on the free exercise of his religion. The trial
court rejected the defendant's claims and sentenced him to thirty days
in jail. On appeal, the state circuit court reversed the conviction. Cit-
ing Ballardr1 2 2 and Yoder,'23 the court reasoned that the defendant had
established that his beliefs were held in good faith and that the non-
regulated hunting of the deer was necessary to the practice of his re-
ligion. Since these two requirements were satisfied, the court next
reasoned that Sherbert ' ' establishes that before a religious practice
may be regulated, the individual's interest in the free exercise of his
religion must be outweighed by a compelling state interest of the high-
est order. Observing that the testimony in the case indicated that the
entire Winnebago tribe would require not more than 264 deer annually
for the exercise of their religious beliefs and that the state allowed over
90,000 deer to be hunted annually for sport, the court concluded that
the defendant's interest in the exercise of his religion outweighed any
120. The night before the hunt, all the hunters participate in a sweat lodge ritual.
Both the hide and the meat are used in the celebration of the feast and at the end
of the feast the specially prepared hide is taken into the forest and left as an offering
to the Great Spirit. See generally Order Reversing Decision, July 23, 1976, Wisconsin
v. Funmaker, No. 003042 (Juneau County, Wis. Cir. Ct.).
121. Id.
122. 322 U.S. 78 (1943).
123. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
124. 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
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interest which the state had in its regulation. Consequently, the court
held that the first amendment protected the defendant and reversed
his conviction.
Summary
The decision in Funmaker is readily distinguishable from Top Sky
and Bushyhead on the facts involved in the cases. In the latter two
cases the holding was that the free exercise clause did not protect the
defendants from prosecution for sales, while in Funmaker the holding
was that the defendant was protected from prosecution for mere taking
and possession. Additionally, Top Sky and Bushyhead concerned an
endangered species while Funmaker did not. Yet to observe only
these factual distinctions is to miss the more serious issue which the
cases leave unsettled. Funmaker holds that in cases where the use of
animal parts is a practice necessary to the free exercise of the defend-
ant's religion, the free exercise clause may be raised as a defense to
prosecution for taking and possession of a protected species. While
neither Top Sky nor Bushyhead was required to decide the issue, lan-
guage in both opinions indicate that in a prosecution for mere taking
or possession of an endangered species the court would be required
to balance the society's interest in animal protection against the Native
American's interest in the free exercise of his religion. In light of the
fact that animals and animal parts play an important role in Native
American religious practices, it is likely that the balancing of these two
competing interests will continue to confront the courts.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose underlying the
free exercise clause of the first amendment is to guarantee the widest
possible exercise of religious practices consistent with ordered liberty.
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied
and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagree-
ment among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on
which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of govern-
ment which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting
views. . . . The First Amendment does not select any one group
for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position.125
Operating on this basic premise, the Supreme Court has developed a
four-part test to determine when a religious practice is protected by the
first amendment. First, it must be established that the religious beliefs
are held in good faith.' 26 Second, if the conduct is to be protected,
125. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1943).
126. Id. at 84.
it must be part of the practice of a religion.'2 7 Third, the religious
importance of the conduct must be balanced against the compelling
state interest in its regulation. 12 8 And fourth, for any regulation to be
upheld the state must demonstrate that there is an absence of less
restrictive alternatives to the regulation.
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At present no guidelines exist to determine two key elements in
the above test: what constitutes a religion and what criteria can be used
to determine the relative weight to be attributed to the individual's in-
terest in the free exercise of his religion and the state's interest in its
regulation.
This note has examined the way in which the state and federal
courts have applied the existing four-part test to cases involving Native
American religious practices. In cases involving the bona fide religious
use of peyote, some courts have held that the practice is absolutely pro-
tected from governmental regulation while other courts have held that
the state's interest in regulation mandated that restrictions be placed
on the free exercise of the practice. In those cases dealing with state
regulation of hair length, some courts have held that an individual's
wearing of long hair is a religious belief protected by the free exercise
clause while other courts have held that hair length is not necessary
to the practice of a religion or that any infringement is not weighty
enough to be protected by the free exercise clause. In the one area
where the decisions have been consistent, the cases involving animal
protection, the relative weight to be attached to the competing interests
involved remains undecided.
All of the areas discussed involve a delicate balancing test to de-
termine if a particular religious practice should be protected from gov-
ernmental interference. The United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated that two crucial factors should be considered as resting on op-
posite sides of the symbolic scale of justice. On the one side are the
interests of the individual Native American in the free exercise of his
religion. On the other side are the state's interests in enforcing some
regulation under its police power. While all of this seems very clear
in principle, its application is no mean task. It is evident that in any
balancing the way in which the scale will tilt depends on the weight
which is given to the items which are on each side of the scale. In
the area of the first amendment the relative weights attached to the
items on both sides of the balance are often influenced by unspoken
philosophical considerations. This is clearly indicated by the fact that
in the cited cases identical values were given different weights by different
127. 406 U.S. at 215-16.
128. 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
129. Id. at 407.
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courts. Indeed, all of the lower court decisions which were reversed
on appeal were reversed not because the appellate court disagreed with
the lower court's principles of law but because the appellate courts at-
tached different weight to some factor on one side of the balance. 130
Furthermore, all of the cited cases involve the problem of deter-
mining what constitutes a religious belief. In some of the decisions,
the courts have been willing to recognize as religious any belief which
was so characterized by the individual who held it provided it was held
in good faith. Other courts have demanded that some recognized re-
ligious group share the belief if it is to be religious.' The language in
the Yoder decision which emphasized that the free exercise clause pro-
tects only those practices which are based on the exercise of a religion
seems to have confused rather than clarified the issue.
In an area as sensitive as the area of freedom of religion there
is a need for concise standards which will enable the courts to protect
with uniformity the rights of the individual. Using the standards thus far
established by the Supreme Court, the lower courts have been unable
to agree on the extent of the protection afforded by the first amend-
ment to Native American religious practices.
It is possible that a solution to this problem could be aided by
another decision of the Supreme Court. In Morton v. Mancari, the
Court held that the recognized Native American tribes were political
organizations warranting judicial consideration. 132 They might also be
held to be cultural organizations with established traditions and histories
of religious practice. While this would not resolve the problems which
inevitably arise when an individual asserts a religious belief which is
unique to himself, it would provide a means of determining that a belief
is religious when it is supported by the cultural and religious history
of the individual's tribe. In addition, the weight to be attached to the
asserted practice could be determined by examining the importance of
the practice to the history and culture of the tribe. Once the religious
nature and importance of the practice have been determined, the
130. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), afj'd sub nom. Tete-
rud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504
P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); see generally Order Reversing Decision,
July 23, 1976, Wisconsin v. Funmaker, No. 003042 (Juneau County, Wis. Cir. Ct.).
131. See generally New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); State v. Whittingham,
19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); People
v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); Pokrywka v. Weld
County School Dist., No. 24786 (Weld County, Colo. Dist. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974); White-
horn v. State, No. F-75-476 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App., June 23, 1976).
132. 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974).
1536 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
balancing of the individual's interest in the free exercise of his religion
with the state's interest in its regulation can be more clearly resolved.
It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will consider this problem
in light of its holding in Mancari and will act soon to more clearly de-
fine what constitutes a Native American religious practice and to estab-
lish criteria which may be used to determine the relative weight to be
given the competing interests involved whenever a state regulation
affects the free exercise of Native American religion.
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